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Abstract
This study uses the EU public power generating sector as a case study to inves-
tigate the environmental efﬁciency and productivity enhancing performance of the
European Union’s CO2 Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) in its pilot phase. Us-
ing Data Envelopment Analysis methods, we measure the environmental efﬁciency
and the productivity growth registered in public power generation across the EU
over the 1996-2007 period. In the second stage of our analysis we attempt to explain
changes in productivity and efﬁciency over time using state-of-the-art econometric
techniques. Our analysis suggests two conclusions: on the one hand carbon pricing
led to an increase in environmental efﬁciency and to a shift outwards of the techno-
logical frontier; on the other hand, the overly generous allocation of emission permits
had a negative impact on both measures. These results are shown to be robust to
changes in controls and speciﬁcations.
JEL Classiﬁcation: O38, Q48, Q58
Keywords: Emissions Trading, EU ETS, Environmental Efﬁciency, Productivity Growth,
Data Envelopment Analysis
1 Introduction
Reducing the risk of catastrophic climatic change requires the stabilisation of the concen-
tration of green-house gases (GHGs) to 450-550 parts per million (ppm) of carbon dioxide
equivalent – a level considered consistent with an increase in average temperatures not
exceeding 2 degrees centigrade (IPCC, 2007). There is little doubt that achieving such a
target is a daunting task that requires a complete paradigm shift in the long-run. In par-
ticular, the transition towards carbon-free energy sources is paramount if this objective
is to be achieved. Focussing on power generation, however, there is no doubt that an
effective climate change mitigation strategy for the short and medium run calls for the
production of energy in the most efﬁcient possible way. Therefore, the role of mitiga-
tion policies is to create incentives to follow carbon reducing practices, to develop and
adopt new technologies, and, more in general, to increase the overall efﬁciency of power
generation. The latter is the focus of this paper.
Corresponding author: Centre for Environmental and Resource Economics (CERE), Department of Eco-
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1We study the productive and environmental efﬁciency of fossil-fuel based public power
plants across member states (henceforth MS, for brevity) of the European Union (EU)
over the twelve-year period (1996-2007) that spans the ratiﬁcation of the Kyoto Protocol
and the ﬁrst three years of the European Union’s CO2 Emissions Trading Scheme (EU
ETS). The main focus of our analysis is whether improvements in terms of environmental
efﬁciency and productive performance in the energy generating sector in the EU have
occurred, and if so, whether it is possible to attribute such changes to climate change
mitigation policies, controlling for other contributing factors.
We focus on the EU ETS as it represents the largest cap-and-trade system currently op-
erating in the world, and it constitutes the centrepiece of the EU climate policy. As more
efforts are underway to introduce similar policies in other countries, answering the ques-
tions posed above is of fundamental importance to inform the debate on the design of
effective policies aimed at reducing the carbon footprint of energy generation. The fossil-
fuel based power generating sector is also a natural choice as it is the largest sector in the
EU ETS in terms of emissions, being responsible for roughly one third of the total amount
of GHG produced by the EU. Power generation is also particularly interesting for other
reasons. As discussed by Widerberg and Wr˚ ake (2009) and Ellerman et al. (2010), the per-
ception that more low-cost abatement opportunities were available in power generation
than in other sectors, and the fact that this sector is not directly exposed to international
competition were the main reasons why power generation faced more stringent regula-
tion having received relatively fewer allowances than other sectors elsewhere in the EU
ETS. This, we contend, makes the EU power generating sector a good case study as it
holds important lessons for a not too distant future when stringent market-based regula-
tion might be much more widespread than at present.
The literature emphasises two characteristics of marketable pollution permits that are rel-
evant to our efforts: on the one hand, like all other market-based instruments, they are
capable of bringing about pollution reductions at least cost (Montgomery, 1972; Tieten-
berg, 1990, among others); on the other hand they have the potential to induce the de-
velopment and/or the adoption of improved pollution-reducing technologies (Milliman
and Prince, 1989; Jaffe et al., 2003; Stavins, 2003; Requate and Unold, 2003). Through both
channels, one would expect emissions trading to enhance the environmental efﬁciency of
regulated ﬁrms.
Despite the obvious relevance of the topic, few studies so far document empirically the
environmental performance of the EU ETS. Ellerman and Buchner (2008) and Anderson
and Di Maria (2010) provide ex post analyses of the ﬁrst trading phase of the EU ETS.
Ellerman and Buchner (2008) ﬁnd that between 130-200 Mt of CO2 were abated in 2005
and 140-220 Mt in 2006 for all EU member states. Anderson and Di Maria (2010) improve
on these results using more reﬁned data for 2005-2007 and estimate overall abatement at
247 Mt CO2 over the entire ﬁrst phase. Delarue et al. (2008) and Widerberg and Wr˚ ake
(2009)explicitlyfocusonabatementinpowergeneration. Delarueetal.(2008)analysethe
European power sector’s CO2 short-term abatement possibilities through fuel switching.
Using both a non-calibrated and a historically calibrated simulation models the authors’
estimates of abatement range between 34.4 and 63.6 Mt of CO2 in 2005, and 19.2 and 35
Mt in 2006. Widerberg and Wr˚ ake (2009) look at the effect of the carbon price on the
CO2 emissions intensity of the Swedish electricity sector for the period 2004-2008. They
ﬁnd no statistically signiﬁcant link between the price of EUAs and CO2 emissions, and
conclude that it is unlikely that there are signiﬁcant volumes of low-cost CO2 abatement
possibilities with short response times in the Swedish electricity sector, which might be
2explained by the peculiar characteristics of the Swedish system.
Ourpapercontributestothis sparseempiricalliteraturebyassessingtheimpactoftheEU
ETS on the power generation sectors using macro-level data for 24 European countries.
In order to do so, we develop measures of environmental efﬁciency and overall produc-
tivity applying Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) methods. We then use econometric
techniques to estimate the effect of the EU ETS (in terms of carbon price and policy strin-
gency at the national level) on both indicators, controlling for other relevant variables.
We ﬁnd that the EU ETS had a positive effect on the environmental efﬁciency of the Eu-
ropean public power generation, and that the laxity of the policy – as measured by the
degree of overallocation of permits – operated in the opposite direction, partially or even
completely offsetting the policy beneﬁts. Our results further show that while the EU ETS
did not seem to affect the overall productivity of public power plants, it signiﬁcantly af-
fected its two components: technological change and technical efﬁciency change. The
pricing of CO2 triggered an upward shift of the generation frontier, while the generous
allocation of permits tended to offset this effect. Overall, our results conforms to the
theoretical expectations about cap-and-trade systems in that the pricing of emissions is
shown to be performance enhancing. However, our analysis crucially emphasises the
potentially negative impacts that ﬂaws in the scheme design may have on efﬁciency and
productivity.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the methodology used to
measure environmental efﬁciency and productivity of public power generation. Section
3 presents and brieﬂy discusses the measures of environmental efﬁciency and produc-
tivity change. Section 4 describes the conceptual framework and the data employed to
analyse the determinants of environmental efﬁciency and productivity change over time.
Sections 5 and 6 present the results of the second stage and, ﬁnally, section 7 concludes.
2 Measurement of environmental efﬁciency and productivity
To measure the environmental efﬁciency and the overall productivity of the power gener-
ating sector across EU member states, we develop measures based on data envelopment
analysis (DEA) techniques. Our use of DEA is dictated by the ﬂexibility and the robust-
ness of this methodology. DEA assigns scores to decision-making units (or, in our case,
to entire productive sectors) on a scale between 0 and 1, depending on how efﬁciently
they convert inputs into outputs. In other words, DEA estimates a ‘best-practice’ fron-
tier given the available information, and then places each observation on or below the
frontier, based on its relative efﬁciency. This has several advantages from our point of
view. First, DEA, as a nonparametric method, only needs to assume that the available
observations belong to the same production possibility set, which is a prerequisite for
comparability, without imposing any additional structure. This is clearly an advantage
given that we use industry level data, and given the diversity of the power generating
sector across the EU. Indeed there are large differences among EU MS with respect to the
type of technology installed, the fuel mix, and the extent of cogeneration, for example.
Such a variety of structures would pose serious classiﬁcation problems within a para-
metric framework. Secondly, as DEA highlights best rather than average practice, it is
better suited to analyse a semi competitive sector such as power generation where aver-
age performers may be well in the interior of the production possibility set. The multi-
input/multi-output speciﬁcation of the technology also increases the informational value
of the benchmarking, in addition to the avoidance of a priori assumptions on the produc-
3tion possibility set. Thirdly, DEA allows for a variety of substitution possibilities among
inputs and outputs that cannot be captured by parametric methods. In particular, by al-
lowing the inclusion of negative outputs like pollution, DEA is extremely useful when
discussing environmental performance, given that the same level of efﬁciency may be
achieved by increasing good-outputs or reducing bad ones. Finally, the nonparametric
models are easy to compute and most of their statistical properties are well established
through use of bootstrapping methods.1
2.1 Using DEA to measure relative efﬁciency
Consider a production process in which desirable and undesirable outputs are jointly
produced by consuming inputs. Let x 2 RN
+, be the N-dimensional vector of inputs,
and y 2 RM
+ and u 2 R
J
+ the vectors of desirable and undesirable outputs (pollutants),
respectively. The production possibility set for this technology is
T = f(x,y,u)jxcan produce(y,u)g. (1)
T provides a complete description of all technologically feasible production plans, and is
assumed to be a closed and bounded set, which guarantees output closeness, implying
that ﬁnite amounts of inputs can only produce ﬁnite amounts of outputs. In addition,
inputs and desirable outputs are assumed to be strongly disposable. Given the joint
production of both desirable and undesirable outputs, we assume null-jointness in pro-
duction2 and, at least initially, weak disposability of the outputs. The latter assumption
proves not to hold in our dataset and we hence opt for strong disposability for the out-
puts.3
Observing a sample of K entities whose relative environmental and overall technical
efﬁciency are to be measured, and letting the observed data on inputs, desirable and
undesirable outputs for each entity k=1,...,K be xk=(x1k,...,xNk), yk=(y1k,...,yMk) and
uk=(u1k,...,uJk), respectively, (1) can be expressed within a DEA framework as
T =
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> > > > <


















lkxnk  xn, n = 1,..., N, lk  0, k = 1,...,K
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(2)
Note that the convexity constraint å
K
k=1 lk = 1 is not included in the above model, as we
assume constant returns to scale (CRS), and that, as discussed above, undesirable outputs
are assumed to be strongly disposable. We assume that the returns to scale are constant
given that we focus on aggregate data at the sectoral level across different countries over
1See Fried et al. (2008) for a thorough review of DEA and other methods of productivity analysis.
2Null-jointness simply captures the idea that the only way to completely eliminate undesirable outputs
is to cease production altogether. Formally, it is deﬁned as: if (x,y,u) 2 T and u = 0, then y = 0.
3We estimated the environmental efﬁciency scores assuming alternatively weak and strong disposability.
The resulting estimates were indistinguishable from each other, and we thus opted for strong disposability.
The fact that CO2 and SO2 appear to be privately strongly disposable is not surprising, given the absence of
regulation on carbon emissions until 2005, the ease with which costs are passed through to consumers in
European energy markets, and the predominantly command-and-control nature of SO2 regulation.
4time and as such assuming variable returns to scale does not seem meaningful (See Coelli
and Rao, 2005, for a more detailed discussion on this aspect).
On the basis of (2), we introduce the following non-radial DEA-type programming model
for calculating the environmental efﬁciency performance index for entity i:
















lkxnk  xni, n = 1,..., N,
lk  0, k = 1,...,K;
(3)
where the lk’s are coefﬁcients representing the intensity levels for entities in the con-
struction of the reference efﬁciency frontier. This model can be seen as a Russell-type
DEA model in the context of environmental efﬁciency measurement (F¨ are et al., 1985).
Examples of similar recent models in the context of environmental or energy efﬁciency
measurement include Picazo-Tadeo and Garc´ ıa-Reche (2007) and Zhou and Ang (2008).
It is worth noting that (3) non-proportionally adjusts undesirable outputs for given levels
of the inputs and the desirable outputs. As a result, it allows some undesirable outputs to
increase so that other undesirable outputs achieve larger reductions in order to reach its
ideal bench-marking point on the best-practice frontier. Since ENV is essentially the min-
imum average of the ratios of the expected undesirable outputs to the actual undesirable
outputs, we may refer to ENV as an average environmental performance index.
In this programme the input constraints guarantee that, at the optimum, entity i will
make use of no fewer inputs than the efﬁcient productive entity it is compared with. The
desirable output constraints ensure that under its environmentally efﬁcient production
plan, entity i produces no more desirable outputs than the technological reference at the
frontier, while the undesirable output constraints make sure that, at the optimum, entity
i does not pollutes less than the efﬁcient productive entity it is compared with. The
inequality constraints on desirable and undesirable outputs ﬁnally imply that both are
freely disposable.
2.2 Using DEA to measure productivity changes
To measure the overall technical efﬁciency we introduce the following model,













lkxnk  fxni, n = 1,..., N,
lk  0, k = 1,...,K,
(4)
5This programme adopts Farrell’s (1957) radial input-oriented measure of technical efﬁ-
ciency to measure the performance of energy producing entities at given points of time,
and as such f measures how much the inputs and the undesirable outputs can be re-
duced while maintaining desirable outputs at their original level. As a consequence, it
only conveys information that refers to the distance from the frontier (i.e. entity i’s rel-
ative technical efﬁciency). For our purposes, it is desirable to have information also on
the way the efﬁcient frontier shifts over time, to assess the extent of technological change.
Several indexes are available for this purpose, in the present context, given the assump-
tion of CRS and the fact that the data support the strong disposability of pollutants at
the aggregate level, we use the Malmquist Productivity Index (MPI) developed by Caves
et al. (1982) and extended by F¨ are et al. (1994). The MPI provides information on produc-
tivity over time and allows us to decompose overall productivity changes into its two
components of technical efﬁciency, i.e. distance to the frontier within each period, and
technological change, i.e. shifts of the frontier over time.
The input-oriented Malmquist productivity index for entity i, between periods s (the base















where the superscript I indicates input-orientation and M is the productivity of the most
recent production point (xit,yit) (using period t technology), relative to the earlier pro-
duction point (xis,yis) (using period s technology). The D’s are Shephard input distance
functions (Shephard, 1953), and all other variables are as previously deﬁned. Values
greater than unity indicate positive productivity growth between the two periods. An



















The ratio outside the square brackets measures the change in the input-oriented measure
of technical efﬁciency between periods s and t, i.e. the efﬁciency change is equivalent to
the ratio of the technical efﬁciency in period t to the technical efﬁciency in period s. The
remaining part of the index is a measure of technical change5 as measured by shifts in the
frontier measured at period t and period s (the geometric mean of the two ratios in the
square bracket).
Providedthatasuitablepaneldatasetisavailable, thedistancemeasuresfortheMalmquist
productivity index can be calculated using DEA-like linear programs as discussed, for
example, by F¨ are et al. (1994) who make use of the fact that Shephard’s input (output)
distance functions are the inverse of the corresponding Farrell measures of technical efﬁ-
ciency, presented in (4). For the each entity i, four distance functions need to be calculated
to measure the productivity change between two periods, s and t. This requires solving
four linear programming problems like (4) for each entity in the sample.
4Note that here undesirable outputs are treated as inputs.
5Note that the change could be in either directions indicating technological progress or regress.
6Table 1: Descriptive statistics of outputs and inputs
Variable Unit Mean Std. dev. Min Max No. of obs. Data source
Power generation ktoe 7,318 506 569 39,679 288 Eurostat
Fuel ktoe 15,346 1128 996 89,896 288 Eurostat
Installed capacity MW 15,382 1080 569 71,072 288 Eurostat, IEA
Labour Thousands of employees 58 4 5 255 288 Euromonitor
CO2 emissions kt 55,214 4,245 1910 345,673 288 EEA
SO2 emissions kt 241 18 1 1361 280 EEA
2.3 Measuring environmental efﬁciency and productivity
To compute aggregate measures of environmental efﬁciency and productivity change in
the EU, we construct an industry level dataset covering twenty-four EU member states
over the period 1996-2007.6 We focus on public power plants - public thermal power
plants and district heating plants - that mostly rely on combustible CO2-intensive fuels,
such as oil, solid fuels and gas.7 We aggregate gross electricity generation and gross heat
production from public thermal power plants and district heating plants to obtain one
(desirable) output variable measured in thousands tonnes of oil equivalent (ktoe).
The production of electricity and heat in this sector also produces undesirable outputs in
the form of emissions of pollutants. We collect data on CO2 emissions from public elec-
tricity and heat production from the European Environmental Agency (EEA). According
to the Revised 1996 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories (IPCC,
1996), these emissions correspond to the sum of emissions from public electricity genera-
tion, public combined heat and power generation, and public heat plants. CO2 emissions
are measured in thousands of tonnes (kt). We also include SO2 emissions among the un-
desirable outputs. These are also available from the EEA and are measured in kt. SO2
emissions are not available for Poland and Slovenia until 2000.
Given the constraints on the number of input variables that can be used in DEA analyses,
we only consider three types of inputs: labour, fuel inputs, and net installed electrical
capacity.8
We construct our labour data using employment data provided by Euromonitor Inter-
national. Starting from the economically active population in the electricity, water and
gas supply industry (ISIC-68, division 4), we take employment in public power plants in
each country and each year to equal the share of such total employment that corresponds
to the share of total output (electricity and heat) accounted for by public power plants.
While this is a rough estimate, we are comforted by the fact that by far the largest share of
employees ascribed to division 4 belongs to the subdivision “Production and distribution
of electricity”.
Fuel inputsare measured inktoe, and include all varietiesof fuel utilisedby publicpower
6Cyprus, Luxembourg and Malta are excluded from the sample due to issues of data unavailability and
the fact that these countries are very small compared to the other countries in the sample.
7According to the Eurostat deﬁnitions, public thermal power stations can be either in public or private
ownership and generate electricity and/or heat for sale to third parties as their primary activity. District
heating plants produce heat used for process or space heating in any sector of economic activity including
the residential sector. Only heat sold to third parties is included in the series.
8As a rule of thumb, it is usually suggested that in order to achieve a satisfactory balance between efﬁcient
and non-efﬁcient entities there the number of decisions making entities should be three times as large as the
sum of inputs and outputs (see e.g. Nunamaker, 1985).
7plants: solid fuel, crude oil and petroleum products, renewable energies, and biofuels. As
fuel input data are available in the same measurement units, they were aggregated into
one indicator.
We use net installed generating capacity as a proxy for the stock of capital.9 Eurostat
provides the net installed electrical capacity data for thermal power plants only, i.e. there
is no separation between public thermal power plants and autoproducer thermal power
plants. This distinction is instead made by the IEA, but it is only available for the OECD
countries in the sample. We use IEA data whenever available, while for the remaining
six member states (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovenia) we use the
Eurostat data on net installed capacity of all thermal power stations as a proxy for the
net installed capacity of public thermal power plants. We believe this is a reasonable
approximation given that the share of energy generated by public thermal power plants
is very high for these countries.10
3 Environmental efﬁciency and productivity measures
The average environmental efﬁciency scores for CO2 and SO2 emissions over the period
1996 to 2007 are reported in Table 2, where countries are listed in decreasing order of
relative environmental efﬁciency in 2007. A second set of scores were also estimated,
including CO2 and SO2 emissions separately. For the sake of brevity these results are
summarised in Figure 3 below.11
Our estimates suggest that substantial reductions in CO2 and SO2 emissions are possible
in most countries. In 2007, for example, the average environmental efﬁciency score was
0.39implyingthatitcouldbepossibletoreduceemissionsoftheseairpollutantsby61per
cent on average, while maintaining inputs and desirable outputs at their current levels.
This potential for emissions reduction in fossil fuel based power generation reﬂects the
wide range of different technology and fuel mix currently in use across the EU, and to
an extent conﬁrms the conventional wisdom according to which some of the largest and
cheapest GHG emission reductions could be achieved in the power generating industry
(see CEC, 2009, for example).
Environmental efﬁciency scores vary across countries reﬂecting the fuel mix used in
power generation. For instance, in 2007, the average relative environmental efﬁciency
for countries relying mostly on natural gas (i.e. in our deﬁnition those where the share
of gas in the fuel mix is larger than 50 per cent in 2007) is twice as large as the relative
environmental efﬁciency of countries whose energy generating sector is more coal-based
(see Table 2). The average environmental efﬁciency of gas-based power generation has
been increasing since 1996 and it visibly improved in the years of the ﬁrst trading period
of the EU ETS. The opposite is true for coal-based power generating industries.12
Table 3 presents the annual increases in MPI for all countries in our sample over the 1996-
9The net capacity is the maximum power that can be supplied, continuously, with all plant running, at
the point of outlet to the network.
10Capacity data are not available for Bulgaria before 1998. However, electricity data are available for all
period of interest. Given that electricity generation data show no signiﬁcant variations in the electricity
production in 1996 and 1997, we use capacity data from the ﬁrst available year (1998) for the missing years.
11The complete set of results is available from the authors upon request.
12Notice that, while a direct comparison across years is not straightforward, as efﬁciency scores are relative
to the best performing power generating industries in each year, the fact that most countries remain on the














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































9Figure 1: Mean environmental efﬁciency scores
2007period. Countriesarepresentedindescendingorderofmagnitudeofthecumulative
MPI changes over 1996-2007. The conﬁdence intervals derived from the bootstrap show
that the annual changes are signiﬁcant for most of the countries.13
Figure 2 shows the mean cumulative MPI measure and its components - Technological
Change (TC) and Technical Efﬁciency Change (EC) over the period 1996-2007.14 On av-
erage, the MPI change in the European public power generating industry was positive:
the average twelve-year cumulative MPI growth across all countries was 9.7 per cent (0.8
per cent per annum).
Finland, Sweden, Slovakia, Portugal and Spain are the countries that experienced the
biggest growth in productivity since 1996, according to our MPI measure. Table 3 also
indicates signiﬁcant country variations among EU member states. We can clearly observe
that most of the productivity improvements occurred in the EU15 member states (e.g.
the average cumulative MPI was 16.9 per cent over the period of our analysis) rather
than in the new MS whose productivity was virtually unchanged.15 This might mirror
differences in structure and developments of power markets between the EU15 and the
new MS. The regulated power markets in most of the new MS might not provide enough
incentives to increase productivity. For example, the Baltic states, Hungary and Poland
all still impose regulated end-user prices for electricity (CEC, 2008), whereas, as shown
by Jamasb and Pollitt (2005), the opening up of electricity markets in the EU15 countries
seem to have induced an increase in the productivity of electricity companies. On the
other hand, this might reﬂect the fact that the average age of the fossil fuel based power
13Although the nonparametric MPI measures are taken to be deterministic, they measure performance
relative to an estimate of the true and unobservable production frontier. Since estimates of the produc-
tion frontier are based on ﬁnite samples, efﬁciency and productivity measures based on these estimates are
subject to the sampling variations of the frontier. It is therefore necessary to assess the sensitivity of MPI
with respect to this sampling variation by bootstrapping the indices. We apply the bootstrapping algorithm
developed by Simar and Wilson (1999) to estimate the sampling distribution and conﬁdence intervals for
the Malmquist productivity indices. Simar and Wilson (2008) present a comprehensive discussion about
statistical inference in nonparametric frontier models.
14The full output of the DEA procedure, including the decomposition of the MPI in Technical Efﬁciency
Change and Technological Change following (6), is available from the authors upon request.





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































11Figure 2: Mean cumulative productivity change, efﬁciency change and technical change
plants in the new MS is much higher than in the EU15 member states suggesting that
per se older power plants are less efﬁcient (e.g. Graus and Worrell, 2009), and that there
might be less incentives to modify these plants during the last years of their life cycle,
especially in the context of regulated power markets.
Figure 2 reveals that the major improvements in productivity occurred during 1999-2002.
As mentioned above, this can be entirely attributed to EU15 member states. As short-
term and long-term fuel switching is incorporated in the DEA estimates by using fuels
and capacity as inputs in power generation, it is not surprising to ﬁnd both periods of
technological progress (an upward shift in the frontier technology) and technological
regress (an inward shift in the frontier technology) since 1996. In addition to that, the
fact that the set of countries shaping the frontier changes over time may also contribute
to explain the dynamics of both, the technological change and efﬁciency change, compo-
nents.
4 Explaining environmental efﬁciency and productivity change
Having computed the environmental efﬁciency scores and the measures of productivity
change detailed above, we now turn to econometrically assess whether the introduction
of the EU ETS had any impact on these two measures. The censored nature of environ-
mental productivity scores, which are bounded between zero and one, requires some ad-
justment before we can proceed with the analysis. Inverting the environmental efﬁciency
scores estimated using DEA in the ﬁrst stage, we obtain an indicator of (the inverse of)
environmental efﬁciency ranging between one and inﬁnity: the larger the value of the
transformed environmental efﬁciency score the lower the degree of environmental efﬁ-
ciency of the sector. Recently, Simar and Wilson (2007) have shown that DEA efﬁciency
coefﬁcients are biased and serially correlated in a complicated, unknown way, making
Tobit estimators not appropriate methods for inference. We thus adopt a bootstrapped
pooled truncated regression approach to estimate our equation:
Yk,t = ak + bZk,t + gXk,t + ek,t, (7)
12Table 4: Overview of variables and data sources
Group of factors Variable Data source
Coal price Euromonitor International
Fuel prices Crude oil price Euromonitor International
Natural gas price Euromonitor International
Solid fuel share Eurostat
Oil fuel share Eurostat
Technological characteristics Gas fuel share Eurostat
Specialisation Eurostat
CHP dummy Eurostat
Economic Activity Industrial production index Eurostat
FDI to GDP ratio Eurostat
Fossil fuel abundance Export-TPES ratio IEA
The EU ETS CO2 price Point Carbon
Allocation to veriﬁcation ratio Community Transaction Log
where Yk,t  1
qk,t are the left-truncated average environmental (in)efﬁciency indicators,
Zk,t is the set of control variables and Xk,t the policy variables of interest. This trun-
cated regression ignores the (unknown) correlation pattern among the residuals ek,t. The
presence of ak indicates that we also include country dummies as they are shown to be
signiﬁcantly different from zero after performing a Wald test.
To explain productivity change and the dynamics of its components, we use linear panel
regressions. After performing an F-test, the Breusch-Pagan and the Hausman tests, we
select a ﬁxed effects model. Our analysis of MPI change is based on the the following
model:
MPIk,t = dk + zZk,t + cXk,t + hk,t, (8)
where MPIk,t represents the annual productivity changes, dk are the individual country-
level effects, Zk,t are again our control variables, and Xk the policy variables of interest.
Similar speciﬁcations are used to analyse the two components of the MPI, TC and EC.
In selecting our controls, we need to take into account that many factors may help explain
the variation in the environmental efﬁciency measures and productivity growth. We in-
clude control variables that describe the dynamics of fossil fuel prices, controls designed
to capture the sector’s technological characteristics such as the fuel mix and the type of
technology used, factors that account for the level of economic activity, and variables that
control for the possible inﬂuence of the endowments of fossil fuels in the country. Our
policy variables focus instead on the participation in climate policies directed to mitigate
CO2 emissions (see Table 4 for an overview). We now brieﬂy discuss the potential role of
each group of variables in our regressions.
To meet the power demand at the lowest possible cost, power plants are dispatched ac-
cording to a merit order that depends on production costs. Since fuel costs account for
approximately 40 per cent of power generating costs for coal-ﬁred power plants and 60
per cent for gas-based power plants (Graus and Worrell, 2009), it is evident that varia-
tions in fuel prices will have signiﬁcant impacts in the type of fuel that will be used to
produce electricity and heat at any given moment in time. Given that gas-based power
generation is more efﬁcient both in terms of emissions and energy than coal- or oil-based
13power generation, fuel prices exert a key inﬂuence in shaping the efﬁcient frontier and
thus determining the overall environmental efﬁciency as well as the relative performance
of different countries.
Changes in fuel prices drive fuel switching in the short run and investment decisions in
the long run. If public power generators have the possibility to switch among fuels in the
short run, we can expect environmental efﬁciency and productivity changes to depend
on fuel prices. However, fuel-switching possibilities may be limited, as they crucially
depend on the type of generating capacity currently installed, and the characteristics of
the electricity market.16 It is also important to control for these technological and supply
factors for other reasons. For example, countries where public power generation has a
larger market share could beneﬁt from signiﬁcant scale economies and have more pro-
ductive public generators than countries that produce only a small share of power by
public power plants. Also, we expect that countries where the share of cogeneration
(combined-heat-and-power, CHP) is larger, will be overall more efﬁcient, as CHP typi-
cally converts 75-80 per cent of the fuel source into useful energy. In contrast, in conven-
tional separate electricity and heat generation, the overall efﬁciency is only 60 per cent
(IEA, 2008).
Investments in more environmentally efﬁcient capacity take longer to react to changes
in prices and policy, and are also determined by the level of economic activity over time
and the degree of openness to foreign direct investment. The pace of economic growth
may have different impacts on environmental efﬁciency and productivity. A higher rate
of growth might encourage investments in technological innovations and lead to more
sophisticated and more efﬁcient plants, or it might stimulate more efﬁcient employment
of resources in order to meet the increasing energy demand. On the other hand, a rapid
increase in energy demand might only be met using less efﬁcient peak load capacity,
which has a detrimental effect on environmental efﬁciency. Signiﬁcant inﬂows of for-
eign direct investments (FDI) relax the resource constraints of the economy, and might
lead to knowledge transfers and knowledge spillovers. In the case of power generation
this might initiate the introduction of more productive and more emissions and energy
efﬁcient technologies.
The availability of a speciﬁc type of fossil fuel in a country is likely to be one of the main
determinants of the choice of generating technology, and of the fuel-mix used in public
power generation. Conventional wisdom seem to suggest that fossil fuel abundance may
be associated with inefﬁciencies. Hoffmann and Voigt (2009), for example, ﬁnd that the
more hard coal resources a country possesses, the less efﬁcient its electricity generation.
On the other hand, it is possible that the willingness to use local, yet polluting, energy
carriers might induce speciﬁc technological innovation that increase efﬁciency and over-
all productivity. The development and deployment of Ultrasupercritical and Integrated
Gasiﬁcation Combined Cycle (IGCC) coal-ﬁred units in Germany represents a good case
in point.
The policy we focus on here is the introduction of the emissions trading in the EU in
2005. The emergence of a price for carbon has a very clear effect as it inﬂuences the
16S¨ oderholm (2001) considers various short-run fuel substitution possibilities in Western Europe, and em-
phasises that fuel switching can occur within a day in dual- or multi-fuel ﬁred plants if the alternative fuel
is available, but might take much longer in different circumstance. Also, switching is easier within a ﬁrm
which owns several power generating units, burning different fuels. Likewise, some conversions of electric
plants are relatively easy and cheap – an oil-ﬁred plant that is converted to burn gas, or a coal to oil/gas
conversion are examples of this – while other are difﬁcult and expensive.
14merit order favouring less carbon intensive fuels over more polluting ones. A CO2 price
of 20e/t adds roughly 40 per cent to power generating costs for coal and 20 per cent to
power generating costs for gas (Graus and Worrell, 2009). The incentives for producers to
switch to cleaner fuels whenever possible are clear. In the medium run, a stable and sig-
niﬁcant carbon price is expected to drive power generation toward less carbon-intensive
technologies (Chen and Tseng, 2008). In the case of the EU ETS, the ﬁnal impact of car-
bon emission constraints, however, might depend heavily on the allocation of the EUAs.
For instance, an overly generous allocation of permits would weaken the burden of the
policy and allow the continued use of carbon-intensive fuels.
4.1 Data description
To control for fuel price dynamics, we use the annual growth rates in the real market
prices for coal, crude oil and natural gas. Since country-level fossil fuel prices are not
available for all countries in the sample for the whole period, we make use of the same
international prices for each country in the sample. As similar strategy is followed by De-
larue et al. (2008), who use international prices and claim that the assumption of uniform
prices across the EU holds for coal and petroleum products, while it might be questioned
for natural gas. On a longer time frame like ours, however, and considering yearly data,
there is evidence of convergence in gas prices throughout Europe. The data are taken
from the Euromonitor International dataset (see Table 4 for a summary).
Our controls for the technicalcharacteristics of the public power generation sectorsacross
the EU include the proportion of solid fuels, petroleum fuels and gas, respectively, in the
total fuel used by public power plants, the share of total electricity produced by public
thermal power plants (used as a measure of specialisation), and a dummy variable to
account for CHP generation. This latter variable takes the value 1 if the proportion of
heat in the total power generated by public thermal power plants exceeds one third, and
0 otherwise.17 All the series are taken from Eurostat.
Following Hoffmann and Voigt (2009), the variable we use to control for a country’s en-
dowment of fossil fuels is the ratio of fossil fuel exports to total primary energy supply
(TPES). Fossil fuels include coal and coal products, peat, crude oil, natural gas liquids
and feedstocks, and natural gas. The TPES of a natural resource is the production of the
resource plus imports, stock changes, and reserves stored in bunkers etc. minus exports.
The source of these data is the International Energy Agency (IEA).
As a proxy for the dynamics of economic activity we use the growth rate of the industrial
production index, while the ratio of total FDI inﬂows to GDP is used to measure an extent
of foreign knowledge transfers and spillovers. Both series are obtained from Eurostat.
As policy variable, we use the average annual price of allowances (taken from the Point
Carbon dataset) as an indicator of the overall stringency of the EU ETS. The ratio of
the initial permit allocation to veriﬁed emissions (taken from the Community Integrated
Transaction Log, CITL) is used to capture the country net/short position, which indicates
the stringency of the policy for national producers.
17Available data do not allow us to distinguish between power produced by traditional power plants and
CHP plants. However, it distinguishes the portions of electricity and heat produced by all (traditional and
CHP) power plants. Since only CHP produce heat, we use the share of heat in total power production to
proxy for the extent of CHP.
15Table 5: Descriptive statistics of explanatory variables before transformation, 1996-2007
Variables Measurement units Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
CO2 pricea e/tCO2 288 2.86 6.57 0 18.40
Allocation to veriﬁcation ratio % 288 25.82 49.33 0 240.81
Coal price 1990 US $/t 288 35.18 9.74 25.32 55.68
Crude oil price 1990 US $/barrel 288 31.17 15.30 12.74 60.24
Natural gas price 1990 US $/MBtu 288 4.08 1.78 2.09 7.57
Export-TPES ratio % 288 9.59 19.60 0 120.08
Specialisation % 288 53.42 27.05 3.36 99.02
CHP 1=Yes; 0=No 288 0.43 0.50 0 1.00
Solid fuel share % 288 52.88 27.40 0.50 98.10
Oil fuel share % 288 10.55 11.44 0.30 60.20
Gas fuel share % 288 30.12 20.80 0 80.69
Production index Index (2000=100) 234 108.53 20.31 71.50 187.97
FDI inﬂow share % 253 5.20 5.32 -15.72 34.04
Note: a. The price of CO2 is available from 2005.
5 The EU ETS and environmental efﬁciency
Table 6 reports parameter estimates for four different models. Model I features the vari-
ables discussed above, but neglects potential non-linearities in the effect that changes
in fuel prices may have on environmental efﬁciency; such non-linearities are, instead,
accounted for in Model II. The remaining two columns provide some evidence on the
robustness of our results.
The key result emerging from our estimations is that, controlling for a number of relevant
factors, the price of CO2 statistically and positively inﬂuences environmental efﬁciency.
This is in line with our theoretical priors and suggests that a process of fuel switching
and efﬁciency improvement was indeed triggered by carbon trading. The second insight
to be derived from our results is that the efﬁciency enhancing effect of carbon pricing was
reduced – and possibly offset – by the overly generous allocation of allowances. It is well
known that many governments across the EU27 distributed more EUAs than would have
been needed, thus reducing the incentive for ETS ﬁrms to economise on CO2 emissions.18
Our estimates indicate that, with the price of permits averaging above 18 e/tCO2 during
the ﬁrst two years of the pilot phase, the overall impact of the EU ETS on environmental
efﬁciency was positive. After the price collapse of May 2006, however, the EU ETS might
have reduced environmental efﬁciency.19
The other results of Model I in Table 6 also conform to the economic intuition discussed
in section 4. An increase in the price of coal leads, ceteris paribus, to an improvement
in environmental efﬁciency, presumably via fuel switching and changes in dispatching
due to modiﬁcations in the merit order. This is expected given that coal is the least en-
vironmentally efﬁcient energy carrier among the ones considered here. Increases in the
relative price of oil and gas have opposite impacts, and lead to a reduction in environ-
mental efﬁciency.
18An excellent reference on this topic is Ellerman et al. (2010), who also provide a thorough overview of
the pilot phase of the EU ETS. Evidence of abatement and emissions inﬂation over the ﬁrst phase across EU
member states is also discussed at length by Anderson and Di Maria (2010).
19This is based on the coefﬁcients from Model I. The average allowance price was 18.40 e/tCO2 during
2005, 18.20 e/tCO2 in 2006 and a mere 0.72 e/tCO2 in 2007.
16The variables Specialisation, CHP dummy, and the shares of each fuel in the total fuel used
by public power plants are included to capture structural characteristics of energy mar-
kets across different countries. The more relevant the role of power public generation, the
higher the degree of environmental efﬁciency, capturing economies of scale, for example.
Countries with a share of CHP larger than 33 per cent tend to have a higher efﬁciency
score, reﬂecting the better environmental performance of this type of technology. The
coefﬁcients of the variables indicating the relative fuel shares point to the conclusion that
countries that specialise in natural gas tend to enjoy a cleaner energy sector.
The positive sign of the coefﬁcient corresponding to the index of industrial production
implies that as economic activity accelerates environmental efﬁciency drops. This is con-
sistent with the coming on-line of less efﬁcient spare capacity to deal with increased en-
ergy demand in the short run. Foreign direct investments, instead, seem to contribute
to an increase in efﬁciency. As discussed above, this might be related to technological
transfer or to a relaxation of ﬁnancial constraints on new investment for local energy
generators.
Finally, in terms of the role of the endowment of fossil fuels, our regressions show that
the abundance of fossil fuels (as proxied here by the ratio of fossil fuel exports to TPES) is
associated with higher environmental efﬁciency, which is slightly counterintuitive. One
possible interpretation, as mentioned above, is that countries with vast reserves of fossil
fuels may have stronger incentives to develop cleaner ways to burn them, especially so
in the European Union.
It seems likely that changes in fuel prices might have different impacts on environmental
efﬁciency depending on the structure of the power generating sector in different coun-
tries. To control for this possible non-linear effects, we estimate a simple variant of our
regression model, which includes interaction terms between changes in fuel prices and
fuel shares. The estimation of Model II broadly conﬁrms our conclusions on the impact of
the EU ETS on environmental efﬁciency. The only difference is that the lower coefﬁcient
associated with the permit price means that, according to this set of results, the EU ETS
would not have lead to efﬁciency improvements in Lithuania in 2005 and 2006, given the
very large degree of overallocation experienced by power generators in that country.20
ModelIIallowsustobetterunderstandtheroleoffuelpricesonenvironmentalefﬁciency.
For example, it now transpires that an increase in the price of coal leads to an increase
in efﬁciency in countries where coal has a large share in electricity generation (proxied
by the share of all solid fuels). This might be due to the fact that intra-coal substitution
(from brown to hard coal, for example) is most beneﬁcial, ceteris paribus, when there is
a large pool of coal-burning power plants in operation. By contrast, in countries with a
large share of oil, a shift away from coal into oil might not be beneﬁcial if the additional
oil capacity brought on-line is older and less environmentally efﬁcient, or if the type of
oil burned has a higher sulphur content than the coal it replaces. The coefﬁcients for oil
and gas prices tell similarly intuitive stories. For example, increases in gas prices lead to
declines in efﬁciency, especially if there is the possibility to switch towards (peak-load)
oil-ﬁred capacity, which seem to be the case for a country with a small share of gas in fuel
use.
While all of these results are rather intuitive, and the ﬁt of the model satisfactory, we are
interested in gauging the robustness of our regression to changes in the set of controls.
20According to CITL data, the ratio of allocated to veriﬁed allowances for Lithuania was 241 per cent in
2005, 199 in 2006 and 197 in 2007.
17Table 6: Determinants of environmental efﬁciency
Dep. Variable: Environmental Efﬁciency (inverse) I II III IV
CO2 price -0.039a -0.025 -0.034 -0.030
Allocation to veriﬁcation ratio 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002
Coal price (log difference)*Solid fuel share – 0.185 -0.215 0.178
Coal price (log difference)*Oil fuel share – 0.255 -0.229 0.247
Coal price (log difference)*Gas fuel share – 0.196 -0.301 0.189
Crude oil price (log difference)*Oil fuel share – 0.288 0.160 0.282
Crude oil price (log difference)*Solid fuel share – 0.202 0.107 0.208
Crude oil price (log difference)*Gas fuel share – 0.217 0.128 0.218
Natural gas price (log difference)*Gas fuel share – 0.066 0.016 0.043
Natural gas price (log difference)*Solid fuel share – 0.071 0.027 0.046
Natural gas price (log difference)*Oil fuel share – 0.074 0.023 0.050
Coal price (log difference) -0.396 -19.000 23.953 -18.321
Crude oil price (log difference) 0.578 -20.790 -10.285 -20.957
Natural gas price (log difference) 0.737 -6.231 -1.327 -3.620
Specialisation -0.023 -0.015 -0.020 -0.022
CHP dummy -0.868 -0.789 -0.669 -0.806
Solid fuel share -0.015 -0.097 -0.027 -0.085
Oil fuel share -0.011 -0.086 -0.018 -0.075
Gas fuel share -0.087 -0.179 -0.102 -0.168
Industrial production index (log difference) 3.912 4.166 3.868 –
Industrial production – – – 1.084
FDI inﬂow share -0.027 -0.018 -0.022 -0.031
Export-TPES ratio -0.044 -0.026 -0.042 -0.034
Constant 0.179 7.902 2.322 6.134
No. of obs.b 160 160 160 164
R-squared c 0.730 0.717 0.750 0.774
Notes: a. , , and  show signiﬁcance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. The degree of statistical signiﬁcance is assessed
using conﬁdence intervals computed using the bootstrapping procedure suggested by Simar and Wilson (2007).
b. The number of the observations does not include observations at the truncation point. Greece, Ireland and the
Netherlands were dropped from the estimation due to lack of data.
c. The ’truncreg’ command in Stata does not produce R2, thus, before performing the bootstrapping procedure,
we compute a rough estimate of the degree of association by correlating the dependent variable with the
predicted value and squaring the result.
18As a ﬁrst robustness check, we replace the uniform (world markets) fossil fuel prices by
so called “regional” fossil fuel prices, attributing available country-level fuel prices to
neighboring countries. 21 These results are reported in column III in Table 6. Despite the
change in sign as refers to the impacts of changes in coal prices, our conclusions on the
effects of the EU ETS remain unchanged. As a further check, we replace the variable that
controls for the level of economic activity – the change in industrial production index –
by the level of the industrial production index itself. As can be seen from column IV, also
in this case nothing much happens to the EU ETS coefﬁcients.
6 The EU ETS and productivity
Table 7 summarises the estimation results for environmental MPI and its components.
Given that the MPI is computed using input-oriented distance functions – see Eq. (5) – it
makes sense to use the same covariates used in the analysis of environmental efﬁciency
in section 5.
According to the results in Table 7, the EU ETS did not have overall signiﬁcant effects on
the development of productivity in public power generation. This negative result, how-
ever, hides the fact that the estimated impacts of the EU ETS on the components of the
MPI are signiﬁcant but tend to offset each other. In particular, the pricing of carbon leads
to a shift in the technological frontier, and increases the TC component, whereas generous
permit allocation leads to technological regress – both of which make sense considering
technical improvements and merit order considerations, if we accept the premise that
gas-based and CHP plants are more efﬁcient overall than coal and oil. The EC compo-
nent, instead, decreases with the price of carbon. This might be due to the fact that while
the frontier shifted out, driven by changes in a subset of countries, efﬁciency didn’t im-
prove as much in most other countries, leading to an increasing productivity gap over
time – this effect might be especially marked between old and new member states.
In terms of the effects of changes in fossil fuel prices, we ﬁnd that an increase in the price
of coal leads to a deterioration in productivity. This effect is bigger, the bigger the share of
coal-based power generation. This suggests that, for countries that rely heavily on coal,
switching to other fossil fuels is difﬁcult. This could lead to tweaking their fuel-mix to
favour cheaper types of coal, ultimately leading to technological regress.
The overall effect of an increase in the price of crude oil is to improve productivity. This
effect is more likely the smaller the share of gas, and is mostly due to changes in efﬁciency
(EC), rather that shifts in the frontier. This suggest that countries that rely mostly on oil
tend to economise on fuel rather than switch away from it, when the price of oil increases.
The coefﬁcients for the change in gas price and the relevant interaction terms suggest that
an increase in the price of gas has a positive effect on productivity change via efﬁciency
improvements. However, this effect is dampened if coal- or oil-based capacity is avail-
able. Interestingly, this productivity reducing effect comes not from technological regress
but from reduction in relative efﬁciency change.
As in the case of environmental efﬁciency, the coefﬁcient for specialisation in thermal
21As noted earlier, country-level fossil fuel prices are not available for the whole period of interest. Thus,
we construct the “regional” prices based on the available country-level data taken from the IEA. Fossil fuel
prices (steam coal, high sulphur fuel oil and natural gas) for Finland, France, Germany and France are used
to proxy the prices prevailing in neighbouring countries. This is not necessary for Ireland and the United
Kingdom as for them a complete set of price series is available.
19Table 7: Determinants of ENV productivity change and its components
Robust Robust Robust
MPIa std.err. Eff. Changea std.err. Techn. Changea std.err.
CO2 price 0.0005 0.0007 -0.0019* 0.0011 0.0023** 0.0009
Allocation to veriﬁcation ratio -0.0002 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0002** 0.0001
Coal price (log difference)*Solid fuel share -0.0017*b 0.001 0.0003 0.001 -0.0020*** 0.0005
Coal price (log difference)*Oil fuel share 0.0017 0.0038 0.0013 0.0056 0.0004 0.0025
Coal price (log difference)*Gas fuel share -0.0013 0.0009 0.0000 0.001 -0.0013** 0.0006
Crude oil price (log difference)*Oil fuel share 0.0053** 0.0024 0.0073** 0.0028 -0.002 0.0025
Crude oil price (log difference)*Solid fuel share 0.0030** 0.0013 0.0052*** 0.0014 -0.0022* 0.0011
Crude oil price (log difference)*Gas fuel share 0.001 0.0019 0.0031 0.0032 -0.0021 0.002
Natural gas price (log difference)*Gas fuel share -0.0022 0.0016 -0.0015 0.002 -0.0008 0.0009
Natural gas price (log difference)*Solid fuel share -0.0036** 0.0014 -0.0028** 0.0011 -0.0008 0.0011
Natural gas price (log difference)*Oil fuel share -0.0094*** 0.0023 -0.0077*** 0.0025 -0.0018 0.0025
Coal price (log difference) 0.1162 0.0923 -0.0067 0.094 0.1232** 0.0576
Crude oil price (log difference) -0.2789*** 0.0958 -0.2756** 0.1199 -0.0041 0.089
Natural gas price (log difference) 0.3375*** 0.1096 0.2411** 0.1079 0.0969 0.0826
Specialisation 0.0062*** 0.0020 0.0045 0.0029 0.0017 0.0019
CHP dummy -0.0327 0.0336 -0.0852** 0.0392 0.0529*** 0.0183
Solid fuel share 0.0023 0.0023 0.0009 0.0027 0.0014 0.0015
Crude oil share 0.0021 0.0024 0.0006 0.0026 0.0016 0.0016
Natural gas share 0.0016 0.002 -0.0013 0.0023 0.0029 0.0021
Industrial production index (log difference) 0.2944* 0.147 0.3112 0.2484 -0.0173 0.1712
FDI inﬂow share 0.0006 0.0014 0.0006 0.0017 0.0000 0.0013
Export-TPES ratio 0.0037*** 0.0011 0.0011 0.0012 0.0026*** 0.0006
Constant -0.5101** 0.2353 -0.2298 0.3203 -0.2817* 0.1562
No. of obs.c 202 202 202
R-squared 0.23 0.21 0.27
Notes: a. The dependent variables are in logs.
b. ,  and  show signiﬁcance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
c. Greece, Ireland and the Netherlands are dropped from the estimation since some of the data was missing for
these countries.
20power plants is signiﬁcant and positive, implying that more specialised energy sectors
tend to be more productive. The growth in industrial production leads to overall produc-
tivity improvements. Contrary to what happened in terms of environmental efﬁciency,
here rapid economic growth pushes towards increased productivity in order to meet in-
creased energy demand.
The abundance variable, as in the environmental efﬁciency model, is signiﬁcant and pos-
itive and suggests that fossil fuel abundant countries are more likely to experience pro-
ductivity improvements led by technological change. Again, this supports our argument
that fossil fuel abundant countries willing to continue fossil fuel based power generation
into the future have more incentives to develop better power generating technologies.
Also in this case, we perform the same robustness tests that we discussed in the previous
section.22 All models produce the same signs for the policy variables. In a subset of
regressions, however, the country-level stringency variable (Allocation to veriﬁcation ratio)
becomes signiﬁcant in the MPI regression. This supports the idea that, as in the case
of environmental efﬁciency, a generous allocation in the pilot phase tends to depress
productivity in power generation. This happens when regional prices are used, as well
as when we use the index of industrial production, rather than its growth rate.
7 Conclusions
Trying to assess the environmental and productivity impacts of climate policy measures
is crucial if policy makers are to make informed decisions about whether to pursue such
policies in the future and how to design them. In this paper we contribute to the scarce
ex post quantitative research on the performance of the pilot phase of the EU ETS using
the public power generating sector as our case study. The public power sector is the
largest sector in the scheme in terms of emissions, and it is also the sector that received
the most stringent permit allocation. As a consequence, it is both relevant for the overall
appreciation of the effects of emissions trading in the pilot phase, and useful in assessing
future developments, as more stringent allocations are to be expected.
Our ﬁndings from the analysis of the environmental efﬁciency and productivity of fossil
fuel based public power plants across EU member states emphasise that, although the EU
ETS was efﬁciency improving, the allocation design - the free (over-)allocation of permits
- dampened some of these achievements.
We ﬁnd that even the unstable carbon price in the ﬁrst phase of the EU ETS, had a positive
impact on environmental efﬁciency. However, overallocation seems to have reduced the
beneﬁts of the policy. This effect might have emerged as a consequence of the perceived
laxity of the cap for certain ﬁrms or might have been driven by ﬁrms trying to inﬂate
their emissions in an attempt to inﬂuence second phase allocations.
Looking at productivity change we obtain similar results. While the carbon price did not
inﬂuence the overall productivity of public power plants, it still had signiﬁcant effects on
the two components of the MPI: a positive effect on technological change and a negative
one on the efﬁciency change. The policy laxity proxy, instead, only emerges as a signiﬁ-
cant, negative factor in explaining technological change. Both sets of results prove robust
to a number of changes in the regression speciﬁcation.
Overall, our work lends empirical support to the theoretical view that carbon pricing
22The output of the corresponding regressions are available upon request from the authors.
21via emissions trading provides the correct incentives to regulated ﬁrms to improve their
environmental performance. It also stresses, however, the problems caused by poorly
designed allocation rules. By looking at EU power generation in the ﬁrst phase of the
EU ETS, we present a case study of a sector where the scarcity of permits was a very real
factor to contend with, at least for most countries, most of the time. In this respect, our
results bode well for the future performance of the EU ETS: as future allocations are likely
to be much more stringent than they were in the pilot phase, the mistakes of the past will
be amended and carbon pricing will lead to further environmental improvements. The
lessons learned in this analysis are quite general, as they are derived from analysing
several realities with speciﬁc individual characteristics, thus they most likely provide
useful insights and information to the many regulators currently planning a host of new
emissions trading schemes across the world.
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